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COMPUTER SYSTEMS AS INSTITUTIONS: SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS OF COMPUTING IN ORGANIZATIONS
Suzanne Iacono aud Rob Kling
University of California, Irvine
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces terminology and develops a framework for incorporating and emphasizing
important social and political choices that become part of the history of Computer-Based Information
Systems (CBIS) and are embedded in the social structure which supports its development and use.
These social and political elements of a CBIS are not just discrete elements in an environment. They
can be organized in specific ways which may enhance usability and performance and, paradoxically,
constrain implementations and post-implementations.
It is argued argue that CBIS, developed from complex, interdependent social and technical choices are
better conceptualized as institutions than as tools. The distinction between tools and institutions is
important for several reasons: the usability of CBIS is the critical factor, not the technology itself;
CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures are more difficult to replace than those with
less social structure and fewer participants; and CBIS vary from one social sctting to another according
to the ways in which they are organized and embedded in organized social systems.
1. INTRODUCTION intended by their designers (Markus 1983). While imple-
mentation research has found no single cause for success
Many information systems analysts and organizational or failure, MIS analysts usually point to discrete organiza-
theorists focus on the capabilities of computer-based in- tional or technical elements as critical factors: inade-
formation systems (CBIS) when analyzing their benefits quate management, lack of management support, user
and limitations. CBIS are characterized as tools for at- resistance, or complex systems (Laudon and Laudon
taining work group or organizational outcomes such as 1988).
productivity-enhancement, increased efficiency, worker
control or strategic advantage. Some researchers have recognized that control over many
aspects of implementation processes is much more diffi-
Discourse which foregrounds the instrumental value of cult to maintain than was previously assumed. One stra-
CBIS is rich and varied. Some analysts narrowly define tegy for managing difficult implementations is the iden-
CBIS as tools to support specific information processing tification of risk factors and probablistic assessments of
tasks. Other analysts focus on social and political impacts success. Another strategy is to broaden the meaning of
of CBIS implementation and use. Political analysts view implementation to include "the entire process of organiza-
CBIS as tools which bring power payoffs such as en- tional change surrounding the introduction of a new in-
hanced decision-making abilities or changes in the distri- formation system" (Laudon and Laudon 1988, p. 625). A
bution of power and influence among different types of broader definition can contribute to increased recognition
staff. Marxists argue that managers use CBIS to increase of the importance of user participation in implementation
their control over work processes and decrease worker processes.
control (Braverman 1974). While each of these accounts
varies in the degree to which social relations are relevant In this paper, we argue that the analytic spotlight should
factors, they all assume that specific organizational in- be moved away from discrete clements of computeriza-
terest groups will be able to control the deployment of tion processes to the patterns which structure the envi-
the technologies in their physical work setting and attain ronment and are part of an organized social system.
the outcomes they intend (Galbraith 1977; Poppel 1985; Many of the elements of the social system are non-cogni-
Simon 1977). tive and taken for granted. Over time, they become
deeply embedded in the social fabric and resistant to
However, we know from empirical studies of actual out- change.
comes of implementing CBIS into organizations that anti-
cipated benefits do not materialize easily. In extreme For example, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy may
cases, a CBIS fails to meet the preferences of many or never be able to effectively share a common command
most users and falls into disuse (Brewer 1973; Dery and control system regardless of the technologies involved
1981). In other cases, CBIS are not used as they were or the adequacy of management since they are committed
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to very different battle strategies and strongly prefer their social and technical intervention (Johansen and Baker
own equipment (Kling 1987). The traditional differences 1984; Mumford 1982; Pava 1983). Much of the literature
between these two armed service units will probably con- on socio-technical design is concerned with identifying a
strain any substantial use of a common system. participatory social process whereby those who will use a
new technology have some influence over the design pro-
cess. The choices implemented through the design pro-
2. EXPLANATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION cess, or the environment which embodies them, are not
FAILURE usually predetermined by the technology. For example,
some organizations have adopted word processors and
Public policy literature points to one kind of organized simultaneously centralized their machine operators into
social system which acts as a constraining mechanism in word processing centers. There is no feature of word
bureaucratic organizations: standard operatingprocedures processing machines that requires that a center be set up;
(SOP). SOPs act as obstacles to change because they are the equipment can easily be decentralized and often is.
deeply embedded in an organization and difficult to con- Regardless of which choices are made, end-users must
trol (Edwards 1980). Public policy analysts argue that deal with the social dimensions of the computing environ-
when a new policy requires change in an organization's ment as well as with the particular computer-based tech-
SOPs, there is less likelihood that it will be implemented notogies.
as its designers intended. One example is the Social Se-
curity Administration (SSA), which was accustomed to While we fundamentally agree with the socio-technical
evaluating individual claims and saw itself as a payment approach, we differ in several important ways.
program. When Medicare became law, the SSA acquired
new responsibilities for health care containment. Since 1) We emphasize continuous user participation in the
they had little interest or expertise in the planning and post-implementation phase of CBIS use, not just
budgeting of health care, they focused on claims denials during the original implementation (Kling and Iacono
in response to unnecessary or uncovered health care. 1984b).
Even after criticism from the Senate Finance Committee
and the adoption of a more active role in cost contain- 2) We emphasize a broader spectrum of participants by
ment, they still limited their activities to those which fit including the influence of resource controllers and
their SOPs. decision-makers.
In MIS, the study of political dimensions in systems im- 3) We focus less on design choices that may be imple-
plementations incorporates some elements of organized mented in software and more on the social and tech-
social systems (Keen 1981). The focus is on power shifts nical choices implemented in computerized work en-
and the redistribution of power and influence in organiza- vironments (Kling and Iacono forthcoming).
tions (Danziger et al. 1982; Markus 1983). These anal-
yses, however, are based on several questionable assump- 4) Our approach is less normative than analytical, al-
tions: though we can provide some direction for future de-
sign and development.
• that the distribution of power is always a zero-sum
game--some participants always end up losers while We argue that CBIS developed from complex, interde-
others end up winners; pendent social and technical choices are better concep-
tualized from a social-structural perspective than from a
• that the outcomes of power differentials among rational-technical or rational-political perspective (Pfeffer
lateral work groups or lateral classes of participants 1982). From a social-structural point of view, CBIS can
will be similar to the outcomes of power differentials be characterized as institutions with organized social sys-
between managers and workers; tems rather than as discrete entities that can be easily
controlled. Resistance to implementations does not have
• that individual participants can know a priori what to result from conscious political actions, but it can be the
the outcomes of a future system implementation and product of the inertia of structure. In fact, this view re-
its use will mean for them not just individually but as cognizes that most organizational actors are in the dark
a group; and about decision-making and what actions they could ac-
tually take to effect change. A social-structural view of
• these participants can turn individual cognition of the resistance can include political actions taken by some or-
outcomes into group political action, such as resis- ganizational actors but it does not require awareness a
tance. priori of what the outcomes may be.
The socio-technical design approach emphasizes yet We will characterize perceptions of CBIS as tools and as
another comprehensive organized social system. Its institutions in some detail below. At this point, it is
guiding insight is that computerization is simultaneously a simplest to define an institution as social arrangements
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which persist and are taken for granted, even when they We characterize the social organization of computing in a
do not work well and some powerful group members particular setting as arising out of three major determi-
want to make changes. Perceptions of CBIS as tools, on nants:
the other hand, contain visions of flexible social arrange-
ments which can be easily changed or replaced by most 1. Political
any group member. While there is no unified body of
analysis which advocates understanding CBIS solely from • Who controls new developments of the CBIS and
an instrumental perspective, these characterizations per- controls the purchase and deployment of asso-
vade much of the literature to some degree. ciated computing equipment (Danziger et al.
1982; Kling and Iacono 1984b; Markus 1983).
3. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF COMPUTING • Any systematic criteria which characterize pat-
terns of control and access to computing re-
In this paper, we introduce some terminology and deve- sources such as status, participation in particular
lop a framework for incorporating and emphasizing im- coalitions, access to special revenues, etc.
portant social and political choices that become part of
the history of a CBIS and are embedded in the social • The deployment of the organization's stack re-
structure which support its development and use. These sources.
social and political elements of a CBIS are not separate
discrete elements in the environment. Rather they can be 2. Social
organized in specific ways which may enhance usability
and performance and, paradoxically, constrain implemen- • The actual distribution of equipment and data
tations and post-implementations. across work groups, physical locations, and time
(Kling and Iacono forthcoming).
We do not know all of the social factors that comprise a
highly usable and stable CBIS environment. We have • Patterns of control and discipline in working with
conducted a case study which illustrates the difficulties the CBIS and associated computing equipment
one organization's members faced when confronted with (Kling and Iacono 1984a; Lawler and Rhode
an important CBIS conversion project. Even when par- 1976).
ticipants took major steps to correct discrete problems,
they could not effectively complete the conversion during • Organizational practices about training users,
a two-year period. Since no single set of elements could computer staff and support staff (Kling and
effectively explain the failure, we examined the particular Iacono forthcoming).
way in which the elements were organized.
• Skills of computing staff, users, and support staff.
We conceptualize these patterns as the social organization
of computing. We define "social organization of com- 3. Historical
puting" as the choices about computing (both social and
technical) which become embedded in work environments • the sequence of its past social and technical con-
and which are experienced by the users as part of the figurations and the sequence of its potential fu-
social practices in their everyday work world. For ture configurations (Kling and Iacono 1984b).
example, a word processing technician who works in a
word processing center will have very different work ex- • the commitments made in the past which may
periences than a secretary using the very same word pro- limit the range of future configurations.
cessing equipment in an end-user department.
The configurations that develop in any given work setting
How people experience computing will vary from one are not purely instrumental or motivated by efficiency
computerized work setting to another according to several concerns. Each configuration has social and political
major variables: implementation strategy, management meanings for CBIS users. Status differences between
style, type of computing equipment, major uses of com- professionals and clerks may be reflected in the quality of
puting, occupations of the users, history of computing in the work stations in their offices. Practices that give
the work group, extensiveness of computing equipment managers newer or larger capacity work stations in pri-
and use, and the adequacy of resources and infrastructure vate offices while clerical workers share older machines in
to support the environment. Combinations of these vari- open bull-pens are rooted more in traditional social pra-
ables will produce both intended and unintended conse- ctices than conscious efforts to increase productivity or
quences. In addition, the computing practices of the efficiency in the office.
work group may seem irrational to outsiders who have no
awareness of the social world within which those particu- Before we present our case, we will contrast characteriza-
lar people work. tions of the social organization of computing as tools and
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institutions. The comparison will highlight some of the capabilities of the technology as it may be used by
ways in which social and political elements can be or- individuals.
ganized. This paper does not test the framework; rather
it identifies a framework and interprets it through the 2. CBIS that are well-used and have stable social struc-
case study. This paper raises many questions which merit tures for supporting and using them (those that re-
future investigation. semble institutions) will be much more difficult to
change or replace than those with less social struc-
ture and fewer participants (CBIS that resemble
tools).
4. TOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
3. CBIS vary from one social setting to another, even
Organizational theorists use the concepts tool and institu- when they are identical "off the shelf' systems.
tion to characterize types of organizations and their social
roles. We use the concepts to analyze major differences
in characterizations of the social organization of com- TOOL INSITrUTION
puting in organizations. SOCIAL: Local and Simple Complex and Overlapping
Negotiating Context Negotiating Contexts
Selznick (1957) distinguished between an efficiency-
guided administration of rational means-oriented organi- POLITICAL: Local Control Shared Control
and andzations and the value-laden responsive process of institu- Self Interest Interest Groups
tionalization. For Selznick, institutions strive for perma-
nence, while means-oriented organizations serve a parti- HISTORICAL: Freedom of the Present Commitments of the Past
cular purpose and people can dispense with them once Gives Hope for the Constrain the Future
Futurethe purpose is fulfilled.
Top managers and other participants often have trouble Figure 1. Three Determinants of the Social
rapidly improving CBIS which are troublesome. From a Organization of Computing
tool view, such difficulties would be surprising since "skill
and will" should be sufficient. Larger scale CBIS have
important institutional dimensions which limit the abilities When analysts emphasize the information-processing
of key actors to transform some of the abstract informa- capabilities of a computer-based technology, they are
tion processing capabilities of CBIS into concrete systems foregrounding its "toolness" or instrumental value for par-
which serve their interests. The development of specia- ticular social units, e.g., faster access to information for
lized computing arrangements facilitates routine beha- individuals, better turn around times for a work group, or
viors but constrains novel behaviors. This specialization a competitive edge for organizations.
and routinization stabilizes social arrangements, but also
impedes organizational actors who seek large-scale When analysts emphasize the social and political choices
changes. that organizational actors have made over time, they are
foregrounding its institutional character. An institutional
The SSA payments system provides an illustration of in- concept incorporates the perspectives of various interest
stitutional inflexibility. It produces about 40 million groups as their choices become embedded in the social
checks per month and was developed in the 1950s in structures around the CBIS. Long after some interest
Autocoder. It remained relatively intact through the early groups have lost power or influence in the organization,
198)s. The SSA has tried to overhaul the payments sys- their interests and visions may still be embedded in the
tem at least three times in the last fifteen years without way things are done. Some of the important elements in
success, although a new Systems Modernization Plan that understanding the differences between tool and institut-
may be completed in the 1990s is in progress. Even ional organizations of computing are described below.
though some new laws were passed during the late 1970s
(e.g, eligibility requirements) which changed the way in
which payments are legally distributed, none of these laws 4.1 Social Determinants
had actually been implemented in software for at least
five years: The image of a CBIS as a tool is associated with tremen-
dous personal freedom. The assumption is that indivi-
The distinction between tools and institutions is important duals are free to use a CBIS as they prefer without con-
for several reasons (sce Figure 1): straints from other sources. The social context of use
appears at first glance relatively simple with few agencies
1. The actual useability of technologies in specific social requiring compliance to their demands or negotiation
settings is the critical factor in assessing social bene- with peers. In actual practice, such simple work settings
fits (its institutional character), not the potential are relatively rare. Issues of social order, power, and
104
social control emerge where more than one person is in- time as they routinely fulfill the computing preferences of
terested in the resource and its potential benefits. particular groups over the preferences of other groups.
They are likely to hire new staff who primarily share their
Institutional analyses emphasize the social use of CBIS world views in preferring particular application domains
and social control over the computing arrangements. (e.g., finance), languages (e.g., COBOL), equipment ven-
When work groups share an information processing re- dors (e.g, IBM), etc. However, specialization and routini-
source, such as a CBIS, the resource managers are likely zation will reduce the ability of DP to engage in non-rou-
to have negotiated particular arrangements with different tine work activities at a later time. Consequently, an en-
groups at different times. These arrangements cross-con- gineering department which seeks computing support for
strain shared resources. Over time, large changes be- computational programs written in Pascal which runs un-
come potentially more costly and difficult, since commit- der Unix on a DEC-Vax will usually find systemic diffi-
ments in the past may limit the range of future configura- culties in obtaining meaningful service from a DP shop
tions. which develops financial applications on large mainframes
under VM in COBOL. (The reverse is also likely: the
Moreover, different user groups often share some inter- finance staff would have difficulty in obtaining high qua-
dependent work schedules and routines. The interdepen- lity data processing service from an engineering oriented
dence of work routines implies that the contribution of computing staff who prefer different kinds of applications,
some component, policy or practice hinges on its depen- programming languages, and machines.)
dency upon other components, policies and work-group
practices. For example, when a fast machine replaces a The inflexibility of organized computing arrangements
much slower machine, one expects speedier handling of impedes those who desire large-scale changes. When
information. However, increased demand on the new routines become outmoded and no longer useful to the
machine may result in some groups of users waiting in organization, many users may push for large-scale
line for access (Schwartz 1975). Their lost waiting time changes in the computing arrangements. The organiza-
may exceed the gains of speedier computing. Thus, im- tional routines which facilitated efficient activities and
provements in some components of an ensemble of com- stable environments in the past may prevent the changes
puting technologies do not necessarily improve overall which the organization believes are critical to its con-
performance. tinuing survival. We call this kind of organized rigidity
social-stmcmral resistance. Rather than focusing blame
for failed implementations on end-users who are charac-
4.2 Political Determinants terized as either uncooperative or politically astute, the
focus is on the choices made in the past and embedded in
When CBIS are characterized as tools, there is an under- the social fabric.
lying assumption that computer-based technologies have
no inherent politics: they are consistent with any social
order. The assumption is that CBIS implementations can 4.3 Historical Determinants
support and enable almost any value system or organiza-
tional goals. It is rarely acknowledged that conflicts When CBIS are characterized as tools, attention is fo-
might ensue from computerization. Typically, it is im- cused on a future of technological perfection and peak
plied that conflicts will be reduced. Some analysts expli- performance. If there are problems of productivity today,
citly claim that computerized organizations will be less they can be resolved through the continual acquisition of
authoritarian and more cooperative than their less auto- advanced technologies. It is assumed that problems will
mated counterparts (Simon 1977). In most of the ac- be resolved when the company goes "on-line" or when
counts of office automation, staff are cheerfully efficient everyone has their own work station. Minor attention is
and conflicts are minor (Giuliano 1982; Strassman 1977). given to strategies for organizing the use of current tech-
The theme that computing fosters cooperation and ration- nologies or to other strategies for social change. A focus
ality glosses over deep social and value conflicts that on the future helps deflect attention from problems of the
social change due to computerization may precipitate. In present, and also offers hope of salvation. Like people
practice, organizational participants can have major bat- who purchase a new car or stereo with every model
tles about what kind of computing equipment to acquire, change, the heroes of this vision invest heavily and end-
how to organize access to it, and the standards to regu- lessly. When there are problems, attention is focused on
late its use (Kling and Iacono 1984b; Kling and Scacchi new or better technologies, not the limitations of the cur-
1982). rent context of use.
When CBIS are characterized as institutions, politics play Institutional analyses focus on the developmental trajec
an important role. Powerful groups can attempt to in- tories of CBIS. Institutions develop a character based on
fluence the developments of a CBIS even when they can the interests they have served in the past, their organizing
not control the outcomes they desire (Kling and Iacono ideologies, and the world views which bind their partici-
1984b). DP departments will specialize their work over pants together. Incremental changes in computing ar-
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rangements usually improve the fit between the system vided PRINTCO with telephone support, but little assis-
and its organization, decreasing the probability that lance on site. DP had problems hiring more pro-
powerful actors could easily replace it. Participants grammers with the necessary skills to work on the conver-
organize their work lives around the belief that activities sion. Many of the original systems lacked documentation
which have become routinized will persist. They come to which further complicated the conversion project. Pro-
depend on existing social and technical arrangements for grammers had patched the MRP system over the years
working and for achieving personal goals. For these and some had left the company. Current DP staff feared
users, and for other important actors in the organization, making large scale changes because they were unsure
a CBIS can become indispensable. about how some of the modules interacted.
To illustrate the defining characteristics of tool and insti- MRP users around the firm complained about DP be-
tutional concepts, we present a case study which examines cause they had waited a long time for a payoff. The DP
computing arrangements in one complex organization. staff's morale was low. They had invested tremendous
effort and resources, but no longer believed they could
convert to the new MRP system.
5. THE CASE OF PRINTCO The senior vice president of manufacturing saw an im-
pending crisis. He formed a data processing steering
Summary case data from one manufacturing organization, committee to guide and direct the DP manager. The
PRINTCO, is presented here to illustrate the differences steering committee gave the DP manager specific sche-
between tool and institutional concepts of the social or- dules, but he failed to meet them.
ganization of computing: Our data from PRINTCO are
based on 44 detailed interviews which were conducted The steering committee hired a new DP manager after a
over an eighteen-month period with 40 respondents in a six-month search in which they found few acceptable can-
variety of roles, departments and levels of authority. All didates. His technical background was weak, but his
respondents were either users or resource controllers of managerial skills were stronger. He promptly ended the
the Material Requirements Planning (MRP) system, the conversion project. Members of the steering committee
core module of the manufacturing computing system in had become resigned to sell the hardware and lose their
the organization. investment in the software. The new DP manager and
the committee decided to continue working with their
PRINTCO is a medium-sized manufacturing firm (about existing IBM System 34, enhancing the MRP system as
800 employees) which designs, makes and markets three best they could and possibly leasing another System 34, if
types of medium-speed dot matrix line printers for the necessary. DP upgraded the existing disk and added
mini computer and small business computer marketplace. memory. Additional ports enabled thirteen people to log
PRINTCO began shipping printers in 1975 and main- on simultaneously. The new DP manager established
tained a fairly constant demand of 12,000 to 15,000 short-term and long-term priorities for departmental
printers a year during the late 1970s despite market fluc- work at the steering committee's direction. In addition,
tuations. During the 1980s, the firm has undergone tre- the committee required and approved written user re-
mendous growth to become a major producer of dot mat- guests for new programming tasks.
rix line printers.
Unfortunately, the new DP manager did not follow the
Key actors built and began operating a simple MRP sys- direction of the steering committee and tried to mobilize
tem in 1977. They wanted better control over their in- support for purchasing a more sophisticated computer (an
vestments in purchased parts so that parts would be there IBM System 38). The steering committee saw little pro-
when needed but not so far in advance that costly inven- gress on the enhancements of the MRP system. After
tory would build up. The system did what they originally ten months, the steering committee fired the new DP
expected, but as the firm grew they began having in- manager.
creased expectations. They began looking for more
sophisticated software to handle additional manufacturing Because of the long and arduous work invested in hiring
computing tasks such as capacity planning and planned the prior DP manager, the steering committee decided
orders. An informal committee found a package that not to search outside the firm for a third DP manager.
satisfied their preferences. However, it ran on a Data Instead they promoted the manager of engineering ser-
General minicomputer, a DG S350 Eclipse, rather than vices to the role of Operations Director, a new title for
on their IBM System 34. the DP manager. Almost immediately, they decided to
buy an IBM 43313 and found MRP software to satisfy
The conversion began in 1980. DP staff believed that it their preferences. They started a new conversion project.
would take one year. After 18 months, staff had not The preferences of manufacturing staff mobilized the ori-
completed the conversion. Apparently unsolvable prob- ginal conversion effort. DP staff avoided requests from
lems plagued the project. The hardware vendors pro- other user departments during this time. Staff in other
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departments began searching for other ways to satisfy Since the implementation of the original MRP system,
their computing needs. the data processing department had become specialized
in altering reports from existing systems written in RPG-
Several departments obtained DEC LSI-11 micro com- II. The DP staff became skilled in producing the routine
puters from test equipment cast off by other departments. MRP reports for manufacturing and occasional reports
They upgraded them into usable computing equipment for finance. The programmers were demand driven and
with the help of their own skilled staff. Because of prob- spent their time responding to constant requests for
lems in DP, no one had paid much attention to the proli- major and minor enhancements. These enhancements
feration of micro computing. Soon six to ten LSI-lls were relatively simple, concrete, predictable, and gene-
were scattered around the firm. One staff member in the rated immediate results, compared with converting the
test equipment area became the informal "expert" in MRP system.
operating, programming and using the micro computers.
The programmers and end-users worked together in very
PRINTCO had hired consultants and new programmers simple face-to-face negotiating contexts. Programmers
to help in the conversion to MRP II on the IBM 4331. would comply with these requests on a first-come, first-
DP staff began working on other projects so that other served basis with no planning or prioritization schemes
users would stop complaining. DP had become a larger, other than what the programmer felt s/he could do first.
more successful organization.
After the second DP manager was hired and the conver-
sion project ended, the new manager instituted some
prioritization schemes for ordering programming work
6. AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A based on the decisions of the members of the steering
CONVERSION FAILURE committee. The manager gave work to the programmers
according to their skill and availability, not according to
We have identified several major problems in PRINT- their informal ties or rapport with end-users. It was
CO's failure to convert from MRP I to MRP II. These hoped that these changes would move the DP department
problems are the product of key actors foregrounding the from a simple operation to one that could handle more
potential information processing benefits of the new tech- complex work tasks and larger projects.
nologies to the extent that they ignored the social struc-
lure of their current computing environment. They were
not simply replacing one MRP system for another, they Skills of Computing Staff. The MRP II software was
were also attempting to change the organization of social purchased from an outside vendor because none of the
relations which surrounded computing in their firm. Al- DP staff had adequate software development skills.
though their computing environment was small and some- Development skills had been unnecessary in the past
what informal, it was usable and stable, i.e., it was highly since they had worked only on maintaining their present
organized. CBIS, the MRP system and some finance systems. They
had never before attempted to hire new staff with specific
How can we characterize the social organization of com- software development skills. PRINTCO's managers pre-
puting at PRINTCO when they first began their conver- sumed that their DP staff had all the skills necessary for
sion? We have selected episodes which illustrate the most computing tasks or could easily acquire them. They
political, social and historical determinants of the social had not realized that the skills and work routines of the
organization of computing. department had become very specialized and limited.
PRINTCO's programmers had learned to program on the
job in RPG-II. The new MRP II software for the conver-
6.1 Social Determinants sion project was technically more sophisticated than the
old MRP I software. The staff had purchased the new
Work Prioritization Schemes of Support Staff. The first software to satisfy MRP user needs in manufacturing.
DP manager had served as a one-man DP shop during The new software would not run on the IBM mini com-
PRINTCO's earliest days. He spent most of his energy puter that the DP staff understood. Powerful manufac-
programming even after he added several more staff. turing managers decided to purchase the hardware on
Requests came into DP informally. The ordering of pro- which the new software would run. However, none of the
jects and distribution of programming time often de- programmers had ever used BASIC, the programming
pended on informal contacts between programmers and language of the new environment. They attended several
users. Short- term, routine projects received the most BASIC programming classes but their learning curve was
attention from staff and long-term, non-routine projects slow. Key actors tried to hire people who could program
received little attention or effort. The conversion from in both BASIC and RPG-Il to expedite the conversion.
MRP I to MRP II was a novel effort which did not fit the However, they could not locate and hire new pro-
routine established work patterns of this small DP shop. grammers with programming skills in both languages.
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Laissez Faire Attitudes. Key actors at PRINTCO had They discovered that there were more problems than pro-
developed a laissez faire attitude toward the DP staff and gress. The conversion effort was expensive and showed
the resources they might need to develop an adequate no results. The laissez faire attitude of the company
social organization of computing for the conversion. toward DP had not proved successful. Key actors who
Once monies were allocated to equipment purchases, had originally thought of their new MRP system as a tool
powerful actors stopped paying attention to the course of for manufacturing staff attempted to gain control over
developments. The original DP manager had never been many aspects of the computing environment. They for-
a powerful organizational actor who could fight for the malized their own membership in a steering committee.
resources he might have needed. Within the framework of the committee, they began to
focus on changes in the social organization of computing
Other staff in the organization, especially staff in engi- that might enhance and support the conversion.
neering, had to develop their own computing environ-
ments. Many of these staff had the skills to develop an Some staff, especially staff in engineering, were not in-
adequate infrastructure of support for their own work volved in the conversion nor were they brought onto the
groups even though they had very little money to spend steering committee when it was created. They began to
on equipment. Since they were effectively excluded from revolt and sought their own microcomputers. These staff
discussions about the conversion project, both at the early viewed their micros as tools which helped them, develop
stages and later when the steering committee was or- small scale CBIS independently of the ineffective DP
ganized, the firm never took advantage of the skills and shop. The "micro-revolution" lasted a year before control
expertise that had developed around computing in the over computing equipment and programming was recen-
engineering departments. tralized under DP.
During the conversion project, two computing environ-
6.2 Historical Determinants ments were developing independent of each other. Each
required investments of time and money from the organi-
Specialization. The most powerful organizational actors zation. Each was left to run its own course with little
were located in manufacturing and finance. They at- support and few resources.
tempted to control the direction of DP and were the best
served customers of DP.
7. DISCUSSION
Programming support and computing operations became
specialized around these services running a small set of We have argued that the characterizations of CBIS in
CBIS and making minor enhancements. The existing organizations can vary from ones that highlight the infor-
MRP was custom tailored to PRINTCO's manufacturing mation processing capabilities to those that focus more
operations, and the staff wanted to preserve all of its vir- on the organization of the social systems in which CBIS
tues while adding the new capabilities of MRP-Il. are embedded. While the former emphasizes rational use
and the ability to direct and control outcomes, most com-
Past Commitments. The organization of computing com- plex organizations have computing arrangements that
mitments led to problems with the MRP conversion. Any more closely resemble institutions. As institutions, the
implementation of a product bought outside the firm use and control of the CBIS are shared among interest
would have to be custom tailored to match the virtues of groups with different preferences, stakes, and historical
MRP-I. It was effectively impossible to conceptualize an commitments. The social structure of the institution adds
MRP-II without accounting for existing commitments to complexity and inertia to the attainment of expected out-
MRP-I and the capabilities of the DP staff. comes.
At PRINTCO, key actors made the decision to purchase
a new MRP system based on its technical capabilities and
6.3 Political Determinants potential benefits to users in the manufacturing depart-
ment. Their computing environment had many organized
Before starting the conversion project, key manufacturing work practices, commitments, specializations and routines
staff members focused on equipment decisions and nego- which they did not take into account when they made the
tiating the purchase. They based their decisions on the decision.
preferences of users in manufacturing who wanted a sop-
histicated on-line MRP system. The informal selection Routine work specializes the social organization of com-
committee invested time and energy into selecting equip- puting. Staff at PRINTCO specialized in producing
ment. Once the equipment was purchased, they returned manufacturing computing reports. They performed these
to their own routine work. After a year had gone by, activities well. A combination of specific skill levels, the
some managers started asking critical questions about the organization of their work prioritization schemes, and
conversion. commitments to certain users in manufacturing led to
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computing arrangements which supported their routine Turner. They helped sharpen our ideas in an earlier vcr-
work but did not support software development. Even if sion of this manuscript. For this version, helpful com-
they had made efforts to attract software developers by ments from Professor Srinivasan and several anonymous
offering higher salaries than they paid their staff pro- referees are gratefully acknowledged. This research was
grammers, they may have not been able to find or attract supported this research under grant #81-17719 and DCR-
such staff because of the commitments they had made to 850-8484
specific combinations of technologies.
Like the SOPs which develop in bureaucratic organiza-
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